



LaGrand and the Law
of State Responsibility
Christian J. Tamst
Looking back at the LaGrandjudgment some time after the decision has
been rendered, one cannot help but wonder that a dispute of such limited
scope should have prompted the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to address
so many issues of general relevance. The most spectacular among these would
certainly be the ICJ's authoritative decision on the legal status of interim
orders under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute, and its recognition that Article 36
(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations protects rights of the
individual. Important as they are, however, it would be unfortunate if these
findings overshadowed some of the other, less spectacular, aspects of the
decision. One of these is the court's progressive development of the law of
state responsibility In fact, in the last part of the LaGrandjudgment, the court
has taken the opportunity to influence, if not direct, the legal rules governing
consequences of international wrongs. It has done so by recognizing that a
state injured by a breach of international law may be entitled to demand from
the breaching state guarantees and assurances that the breach will not be
repeated.
That tus issue arose at all was due to the factual peculiarities of the case.
In Germany's view, none of the traditionally accepted forms of reparation was
sufficient to remedy the m jury caused by the United States. After the
execution of Walter LaGrand, Germany could no longer sensibly uphold its
initial claim for restitution m the form of the annulment of the national
judgments. Since there was no evidence of material losses, no claims for
compensation had been brought. The United States was willing to provide
satisfaction in the form of formal apologies, but this seemed insufficient.
German counsel argued that there was a need for "a system which does
not automatically reproduce violation after violation of the Vienna
Convention, only interrupted by the apologies of the United States
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Government."' In addition to apologizing, the United States would thus have
to take concrete steps to ensure'that the-violatiota would not be repeated. The
United States vigorously denied that such claims for guarantees and
assurances of non-repetition were an accepted remedy under international law
and argued that, in any event, by informing state authorities about the rights of
foreigners under the Vienna Convention, it had already demonstrated its
commitment to prevent future violations.
In one of the more remarkable passages of the judgment, the ICJ largely
granted the German claim, holding that,
[Ain apology is not sufficient in this case [of the LaGrand brothers), as it would not be in
other cases where foreign nationals have not been advised without delay of their rights
under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna Convention and have been subjected to
prolonged detention or sentenced to severe penalties.2
In these cases, the United States was under a duty to "allow review and
reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the
violation of the rights set forth in the Convention."3
Unfortunately, the court did not specify the exact content of this duty,
leaving the choice of means to the United States. In terms of securing the
implementation of the judgment within the United States, this may have been
a mistake. As Professors Fitzpatrick and Quigley demonstrate in their
contributions to this symposium, U.S. courts, including the Supreme Court,
have been reluctant to grant meaningful remedies for those claiming a
violation of Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention.4 A clear statement by the
ICJ prescribing the means by which the United States would have to "allow
review and reconsideration" might have, therefore, been preferable.
From an international law perspective, however, it would be wrong to
criticize the ICJ's holding as unduly vague. For a start, the decision means that
the United States is under a legal duty to take positive measures in order to put
into place a system enabling foreign citizens and states to protect their rights
under the Vienna Convention. The LaGrandjudgment makes clear that under
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, national courts cannot simply dismiss
claims of individuals whose right to consular notification has been
disregarded. The judgment expressly states that in future cases where
convictions are obtained following a failure to provide consular notification
under the Convention, "it would be incumbent upon the United States to allow
the review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking
account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention." ' Given that
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the United States had argued that Article 36 did not impose any duties relating
to subsequent review procedures before, criminal courts, this should not be
discounted lightly.
More importantly, by prescribing how the United States would have to
perform its obligations in the future, the court has recognized Germany's right
to demand guarantees and assu ances of non-repetition from the United States.
Given the paucity of previous state practice supporting such claims for
guarantees and assurances, this-at least from a conceptual point of view-is
a surprisingly clear finding. Bearing in mind the parties' submissions, it is
particularly surprising that the court apparently did not feel the need to
elaborate in detail why guarantees and assurances were due, or whether it was
competent to award them. The court's decision raises the usual warnings
about judicial activism. A full rebuttal of these concerns is beyond the scope
of this commentary, so I will limit myself to noting that in its Articles on State
Responsibility, adopted shortly after the LaGrandjudgment, the International
Law Commission has fully endorsed the court's decision on guarantees and
assurances.
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I believe that it is more fruitful to focus on the implications of the
recognition of guarantees and assurances. No doubt caution is required, but it
seems safe to say that this recognition could indeed mark a trend towards a
broader approach to the law of state responsibility. By recognizing, for the
first time, a state's right to obtain guarantees and assurances of non-repetition,
the court has accepted a remedy that is not only new, but also qualitatively
different from the traditionally accepted forms of reparation. As is clear from
the term itselt "reparation" as the prime consequence of international wrongs
is concerned with the restoration of the status quo, and with remedying the
effects of past wrongs. Of course, as a side-effect, one would hope that the
duty to provide reparations deters the wrongdoing state from committing
future breaches. But primarily, it is restorative, or backward-looking. This in
turn has tended to reinforce a bilateral understanding of responsibility:
restitution, compensation, and satisfaction aim at restoring the status quo in
relation to the injured state. Multilateral perspectives on international law are
lost; this restorative approach to responsibility disregards the general concern
of all states in the observation of international law.
In contrast, guarantees and assurances of non-repetition as recognized in
LaGrand serve a different function. Unlike restitution, compensation or
satisfaction, they are forward-looking; not concerned with remedying past
wrongs, but with preventing future breaches. By recognizing this remedy, the
judgment seems to move away from a purely restorative approach to
responsibility. The court acknowledges that in specific situations, the main
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function of responsibility can be, as the International Law Commission put it
in the Articles on State Responsibility, to restore "confidence in a continuing
relationship."7 This is a welcome readjustment, since it enables states to make
claims that directly aim at preserving the integrity of legal relations.
Moreover, in situations involving breaches of general international law
or multilateral treaties (such as the Vienna Convention), a future-oriented
obligation to prevent future breaches can hardly be limited to bilateral legal
relations between injured and responsible states. Although under Article 59 of
the ICJ Statute the court's judgment formally is only binding inter partes,
judgments awarding guarantees and assurances of non-repetition will have a
more general impact on a legal situation. It is hard to imagine that in future
disputes U.S. courts should distinguish between cases involving Germans and
other foreign nationals. In the quotation above, the ICJ itself seems to admit as
much when holding that "an apology is not sufficient in this case, as it would
not be in other cases where foreign nationals have not been advised ... of
their rights ... ."8 President Guillaume's declaration similarly acknowledges
that while the dispositif of the judgment could only refer to German nationals,
there was "no question of applying an a contrario interpretation." 9 In other
words, where a state is under a duty to adopt changes to its existing laws and
regulations, the fiction underlying Article 59 of the ICJ Statute will become
more difficult to uphold.
To sum up, by recognizing, for the first time, that states may be entitled
to obtain guarantees and assurances of non-repetition, the court may have
opened the door for a broader approach to state responsibility in international
law. The events that led to the institution of proceedings by Germany against
the United States were regarded by many as tragic. However, those who were
frustrated in March 1999 by the court's inability to prevent the execution of
Walter LaGrand may find it comforting that the court's judgment
progressively develops and strengthens the preventive function of the law of
remedies. While the case has come too late to protect the individuals whose
name it bears, it will help solve future cases involving the right to consular
notification in a less confrontational manner. This is good news since, of all
issues, the question of capital punishment does not lend itself to being solved
in a restorative way.
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